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The overriding question Stroud confronts in John Dewey and the Artful Life is how 
to render more of life’s experiences, including the ensuing benefits, as aesthetic or 
artful as possible. The answer to this question is challenging and complex. The claim 
most aesthetic theories make is that an object, activity, or experience is artful if and 
only if it has intrinsic value. Although what constitutes intrinsic value is widely 
contested, having value in and of itself is a necessary and sufficient condition for an 
object to be art or an experience aesthetic. This value gives art and aesthetic experi-
ence their unique quality and separates them from everyday objects, activities and 
experiences with only instrumental value; that is, value for the sake of something 
else. Such a view of art and aesthetic experience has long dominated not only our 
cultural narrative and practices, but our individual thoughts and behaviors as well.
As Dewey has shown repeatedly (e.g., in Experience and Nature, The Quest for 
Certainty, Art as Experience), this view of art and aesthetic experience is grounded 
in a distorted understanding of experience. This view is pervaded with intellectu-
ally fallacious dualisms, especially the belief that items of reflection are the con-
stituents of primary experience. In contrast, for Dewey, the constituents of primary 
experience are noncognitive or pre-reflective, consisting of deep-seated habits (as 
acquired predispositions to manners or modes of response) of which we are mini-
mally aware, at best. The fallacy of dualism and its consequent separation in expe-
rience fractures the unity of individual and collective experience and, in turn, the 
unity of self and community.
John Dewey and the Artful Life consists of eight chapters. In the first chapter, 
Stroud establishes the overall context for his project and introduces the reader to 
its basic structure in broad outline. The second chapter introduces the problem of 
the value of aesthetic experience using contemporary scholarship in art theory, and 
sets the stage for Stroud’s subsequent Deweyan analysis of experience. In the third 
chapter, Stroud presents a Deweyan account of aesthetic experience he refers to as 
“experiential” as an alternative to traditional “causal” theories. The fourth chapter 
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uses Dewey’s notion of “progressive adjustment” to argue that moral value and cul-
tivation integrally involves attention to the present situation as both the spirit and 
method through which conduct is made morally worthy. Here Stroud emphasizes 
the importance of a first person focus on the individual and the orientation of one’s 
attentiveness to situations and relationships.
In the fifth chapter, Stroud illustrates the rich communicative value of art 
by placing its communicative aspect in the context of a particular audience. As 
such, it implies the notion of intention; that is, humans communicate purposely 
to achieve certain results, transform others, and so on. The sixth chapter exam-
ines how Stroud’s view of orientation fits into Dewey’s meliorism (as improvement 
of experience). This occurs by shaping one’s immediate and reflective attention in 
ways that render human experience more enjoyable and conducive to growth by 
making one’s activities more unified, alive, and absorptive. For Stroud, the type of 
orientation to be cultivated should guide one’s adaptive engagement with the pres-
ent situation, with all its resources and obstacles, in such a way that the activities, 
desires, and goals makes one’s experience more unified. In the seventh chapter, 
Stroud shows how growth and the aesthetic represent a unified, consummatory, 
and absorptive engagement of a live creature with its present situation. What are 
vitally important to Stroud’s account are the mental habits/orientations that can 
be meliorated to increase one’s chances of and opportunities for growth. In terms 
of the subjective quality of experience, orientations are what make the difference 
between activity/conduct being artful or being fragmented drudgery. The eighth 
and final chapter lays out a number of possible criticisms of the arguments of pre-
vious chapters and Stroud’s responses.
Although Dewey often pointed to the connection between aesthetic experi-
ence and morality, Stroud observes that he never articulated a full account of the 
connection. Stroud seeks to connect art and aesthetic experience to moral value 
by showing how art can be understood as a path toward moral cultivation, gaining 
and refining those values that are normatively beneficial to living the best life pos-
sible. Using Dewey’s reconstruction of knowledge, morals, and aesthetic experience, 
Stroud shows how art can be integrated into the practical, goal-driven activities 
associated with everyday living, particularly those that improve what we do, how 
we do it, and who we are. Stroud characterizes his account of aesthetic experience 
as “experiential” and provides a critical analysis of how it differs from traditional, 
and generally accepted, “causal” theories. He also contrasts Dewey’s “operational 
meliorism,” which stresses habit reconstruction, with his own account of orienta-
tional meliorism, which emphasizes that the way to improve the quality of one’s 
experience is through the adjustment of one’s orientation toward the world, self, 
others, and actions (see especially pages 138–43 and 159–65). 
One idea central to Stroud’s account is that both morality and aesthetic expe-
rience involve progressive adjustment of the individual in light of some concrete 
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situation. The adjustment process requires absorptive attention in order to alter or 
improve one’s orientation; that is, those deep-seated habits that generate the quality 
of one’s present and future experience. Aesthetic experience, then, is found in one’s 
attention to and absorption in the richness of the present situation, whether con-
templating art objects or participating in a theater production of a play by Bertolt 
Brecht. Another problematic dualism in traditional aesthetic theory is the internal/
external dichotomy of art, which assumes that a fairly concretized and determin-
able boundary exists between art objects and other objects and states of affairs. 
Stroud abandons the internal/external dualism and argues for a shift in focus to 
how attitudes condition artistic experience. Connecting aesthetic experience to 
one’s immediate and reflective subjective orientations (attitudes), for Stroud, is what 
makes the immediacy and qualitative uniqueness of aesthetic experience so valu-
able and striking. In this regard, Stroud cites a recent study of workers’ happiness 
that found hospital cleaners who saw their jobs as an integral part of the hospital’s 
mission to heal people also reported greater levels of happiness and satisfaction 
than those who saw their jobs as merely cleaning up undesirable messes.1
Stroud uses Dewey’s reconstruction of intrinsic value to account for its imme-
diately experienced value and more instrumental and reflective phases as well. He 
still attends to those causal factors noted by reflection that are simultaneous with 
its experiential, qualitative aspects. Not only is the felt immediacy of aesthetic 
experience captured, but also the morally efficacious qualities associated; that is, 
the resulting unification of means and ends. Stroud’s reconstruction of aesthetic 
experience requires an orientation of complete absorption in the immediate quali-
ties presented. It also demands reflection on the meaning of those qualities as con-
nected to other events, qualities, or states of affairs. This reflective orientation must 
be rendered habitual in order to connect aesthetic experience with value. This is the 
way in which reflective activity provides added meaning. It allows for the ordering 
of values or instating of an end-in-view so as to guide present activity, whether as 
moral action directed toward others or as thought directed toward the object of 
aesthetic experience.
Using Dewey’s notion of progressive adjustment, Stroud shows that moral 
valuation and cultivation involve a focusing of personal attention on the present 
situation. It is the relationship in which one is embedded that forms the “spirit and 
method” of conduct and makes it morally worthy. Reflective or mediating activi-
ties, in some situations, can imbue present activity with more meaning and, to 
some extent, modify one’s capacities (e.g., internal dispositions, impulses, inclina-
tions). The implication for moral cultivation is wide-ranging. It begins with the self- 
realization that optimal adjustment, in light of the environmental situation, occurs 
whenever one’s capacities are expressed in a sustainable, meaningful, and effective 
fashion; that is, expressing impulses that are well-adjusted to other impulses and 
to the situation. So whether the end point of moral cultivation is “goodness” or the 
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“progressive readjustment of conduct” to the demands of the environment, what-
ever conduces to this end point has moral value. Moreover, the agent and the act 
are not inherently separate, but are rather parts of a single activity. Key to Stroud’s 
view of moral cultivation as “progressive adjustment” is the activity of developing 
an attitude of attentiveness to one’s present situation. This is necessary because (1) 
the moral situation is fundamentally a present situation, (2) it is a key constituent 
in upholding one’s relational obligations, (3) the ends and implicated goals of moral 
activity always occupy a present situation as part of the continuous life of purposive 
activity, and (4) it is a vital way to cultivate the self toward the goal of progressive 
adjustment. Further, moral cultivation is not just about self-realization—it improves 
the community by bringing it closer to its overall realization. Since the activities of 
each agent affect others, there may be a multiplier effect to self-realization. Stroud 
observes that since situations continue to change, perhaps an attitude of attention 
in both the present and future is as final as any moral end becomes for Dewey.
Stroud’s reading of Dewey suggests that a complete aesthetic situation involves 
a communicative aspect. Expression is coupled with reception so that the artist and 
the audience attain a rich, full, and unified response. Instead of the intention of the 
artist, what is most important in the aesthetic situation is the observer’s orienta-
tion toward the art object. This means that an art object can be morally cultivating 
because it is an instantiation of the end point of moral contemplation. At the end 
point, one’s attention to a concrete situation given in the present (i.e., the art object) 
is engaged with one’s deliberative, reflective, and imaginative faculties. The fact that 
experiences of an art object are framed selectively is what draws one’s attention and 
interest to the object’s details, situations, configurations, meaningful properties, or 
qualities. As a result of this engagement, one’s attention is rewarded with changed 
or added meaning in an experience. Stroud’s emphasis on the importance of atten-
tion in aesthetic experience shifts the very notion of criticism. Aesthetic critique 
goes from being merely a subjective description of the critic’s experience (judicial 
criticism) to the critic’s experience of the object’s qualities, including how these 
relate to its constitution and effects on auditors. Instead of comparative methods 
for qualitatively measuring the object, criticism involves an analysis of the con-
stituent parts of an art object and a synthesis of those parts into a unified whole. 
Hence, criticism is not about telling someone what an important work of art is or 
the impression had, but about expanding and deepening the critic’s experiences 
(as well as those of the critic’s audience) by providing a possible orientation that 
helpfully orders and improves future experiences.
Art and morality require engagement in anticipatory activity. Stroud uses 
Dewey’s theory of deliberative activity, with particular emphasis on the process of 
dramatic rehearsal, to develop an understanding of moral value as it relates to art 
objects. Dramatic rehearsal is an imaginative way to reflect on what one ought to 
do without doing it first. It also entails placing attention on something that one may 
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have previously overlooked. Imagination plays a vital role in dramatic rehearsal 
because it opens up the possibility of improved meaning, which, in turn, leads to 
more adaptive or flexible responses to future situations (i.e., Deweyan growth). 
Through their evocative and communicative power, art objects focus the observers’ 
attention on their embedded values. These objects can also change or strengthen 
those values by making present experience more reflective and certain. The expe-
rience of art objects, for Stroud, can be morally cultivating because of the unique 
integration of means and ends in these sensuous objects. This integration occurs 
in deliberation and its associated process of dramatic rehearsal. The power derived 
from art objects is their intentional nature; that is, their ability to frame and focus 
our attention and hone our ability to progressively adjust and grow as agents. In 
terms of moral cultivation, then, we should foster those habits that experience has 
shown to be efficacious—for instance, habits of sensitivity, generosity, imagina-
tion, and impartiality.
According to Stroud, both aesthetic and nonaesthetic experience depend 
on the subjective variable of orientation. Aesthetic value is intrinsic value, or the 
immediate attention paid to one’s doing or undergoing, as opposed to instrumen-
tal value, or the worth of a means to an end. The value of Stroud’s account of ori-
entational meliorism is that it offers strategies to improve the quality of one’s lived 
experiences. Although one’s orientations can be altered as a result of the activities 
of others (e.g., through education), Stroud emphasizes those alterations that are the 
result of an individual taking initiative. Instantiating such an orientation involves 
the constant practice of being attentive to the present activity and its materials, alter-
ing the ways of education to better equip individuals to enjoy their work activities, 
and through change that is (1) self-initiated and (2) directed by conscious effort. In 
the end, living an artful life requires us to recognize that the self and the world we 
are creating through our actions constitute a work of art worth attending to with 
energy, care, and devotion.
John Dewey and the Artful Life is not only a solid and valuable addition 
to Dewey scholarship in general, but it is a particularly welcome addition to the 
growing scholarship on Dewey’s view of human well-being. Stroud’s arguments 
are well developed, extensively documented, and placed within the context of con-
temporary theories of art and aesthetic experience. Although there are a number of 
contributions this philosophically sharp and complex work makes to the existing 
Dewey scholarship, perhaps its most valuable contribution lies in Stroud’s notion 
of orientational meliorism. One minor structural complaint, however, is Stroud’s 
use of the concluding chapter to address a number of possible criticisms and his 
responses to them. Most readers will likely find the placement inconvenient and 
wish that these points were addressed in the preceding text.
In conclusion, Stroud’s book will find a readership not only among philoso-
phers of art and art educators, but also among a general audience of practitioners. 
Educators interested in art and aesthetics, for example, will likely find his discus-
sion of the importance of attentiveness and orientation intellectually stimulat-
ing. Similarly, readers interested in the relationship between education and moral 
cultivation will probably value his discussion of orientational meliorism. Finally, 
rhetoric and communications scholars should appreciate Stroud’s argument for the 
aesthetics of everyday communication. All in all, the book is a first-rate contribution 
to the literature on Dewey’s theory of art, art education, and his philosophy of art.
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